Lenders that fund larger shares of a syndicated loan typically receive larger percentage upfront fees than smaller lenders. This paper studies sovereign syndicated loan contracts in the period 1982-2006 to explore this fact. In our dataset of 288 contracts large lenders obtain on average an 8.5 percent higher return on their funds than small lenders who join the syndicate. Our analysis shows that the return premium large lenders receive is positively affected by anticipated future liquidity problems of the borrower and by the number of banks. Our analysis also reveals that the return premium is not used to control the number of banks that join the syndicate. We interpret our findings as indicating that the fee structure on syndicated loans incorporates anticipated costs associated with a borrower illiquidity, notably the costs of coordinating the workout and providing liquidity insurance, but that the fee structure does not serve the additional purpose of curbing these costs by reducing the number of lenders in the syndicate.
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Introduction
A syndicated loan is a loan financed by multiple banks.
1 Syndicated loans form the most important source of external finance for corporations and an important source of funding for sovereign borrowers in developing countries. Research on syndicated lending has picked up since the start of the new millennium. Its most important agenda has been to establish the link between borrower characteristics (such as the riskiness of borrower, or borrower opacity, etc.) on the pricing of syndicated loans, the decision whether to syndicate, and the structure of the syndicate (Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) , Pichler and Wilhelm (2001) , Lee and Mullineaux (2004) , Coleman, Esho and Sharpe (2006) , Sufi (2007) , Gatev and Strahan (2008) , Ivashina (2008) , and Wittenberg-Moerman (2008)).
In this paper we document and analyze a feature of syndicated lending that has so far not been discussed in the literature: large lenders typically earn more than small lenders in syndicated lending arrangements. Although the interest spread received by syndicate members is the same, banks also receive fees at the time the contract is signed and these typically differ across banks. Some of these upfront fees are linked to specific services offered by the lenders, such as for example the arranging fee, the agent fee, or underwriting fees. Yet, other upfront fees are essentially simply paid for providing the funds, for example the participant, management, and lead management fee. In this paper, when using the term "upfront fees" (or presenting statistics about it) we only refer to the latter type of upfront fees, which are not clearly identifiable with any services offered by 2 the banks who receive them. These upfront fees usually increase in discrete steps in the committed amount. For example, the upfront fee may be 20 basis points for banks that commit between $5 and $10 million, 30 basis points for banks who commit between $10 and $20 million, and 35 basis points for banks that commit more than $20 million. In our dataset of 288 syndicated loans issued or guaranteed by developing countries in the period November 1982 -December 2006, the upfront fees associated with the largest and the lowest possible commitments differ on average by 20 basis points. We compute that this means that lenders in the largest bracket receive an annual rate of return (interest spread plus "annualized" upfront fee) which is on average 8.5 percent higher than lenders in the smallest bracket. While risk-aversion can perhaps explain why lenders demand a higher return for a greater commitment, the really relevant question is why borrower are willing to pay larger lenders more.
We look into one possible reason that may explain the phenomenon that large lenders obtain a higher return than small lenders. We analyze whether the return premium of large lenders can be attributed to anticipated liquidity problems of the borrower.
Borrower illiquidity 2 implies costly renegotiations and rational borrowers and lenders would therefore price in such costs. Furthermore, in a context with multiple lenders banks may not carry the renegotiation costs proportionally to their funding shares. The main hypothesis we test in this paper is whether larger lenders receive higher returns because they carry a disproportionately large share of the burden of such renegotiation costs. This hypothesis has its roots in the literature on relationship lending. In the context of 3 corporate loans one of the functions of a borrower's relationship lender or hausbank is to act as a liquidity insurer in situations of liquidity shortages (e.g. Boot (2000) and Elsas and Krahnen (1998) ). Additional evidence shows that the key element that explains whether a bank views itself as a borrower's relationship lender is the relative size of the bank's share of the borrower's externally attracted funds (Elsas (2005) ). Large lenders may play a similar role in sovereign syndicated lending.
A second hypothesis we test is inspired by the observation that borrowers and lenders who appreciate the possibility of future liquidity problems will structure the loan contract so as to minimize the expected damage of disorderly workouts. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) explain theoretically that disorderly workouts are more likely to happen as the number of lenders increases because of a hold-out problem between them.
However, they note that smooth workouts can be counter-productive as well because the borrower may not exert sufficient effort and default for strategic reasons. Thus Bolton and Scharfstein argue that the optimal number of lenders balances the effect of the holdout problem against the default deterrence effect of more lenders. Consistent with this Ongena and Smith (2000) show that weak creditor rights and poor legal enforcement are associated with more lending relationships, and Esty and Megginson (2003) show that the number of lenders involved in project finance is larger in constituencies with weaker creditor rights. None of these papers discusses the mechanism that is used to target the number of lenders, and the upfront fee schedule in syndicated loans may well be instrumental in this context. By granting higher rewards for larger commitments lenders may be incentivized to commit to higher shares of the loan, thus reducing the number of lenders in the syndicate. The second hypothesis we test is therefore that sovereign 4 borrowers offer a higher rate of return for greater funding commitments with the aim of reducing the number of lenders in the syndicate.
We selected our dataset to comprise loans where the problems associated with anticipated illiquidity can be expected to be large a priori. First, our dataset comprises syndicated loans, thus contracts with multiple lenders. This brings in scope for coordination problems and hold-outs between banks in workouts.
3 Furthermore, we consider sovereign loans and this means that defaults and work-outs are not governed by structures akin to bankruptcy codes in a corporate debt context. Sovereign loan contracts and defaults are complicated furthermore by sovereign immunity which results in the inability of the creditors to collateralize the assets of the sovereign debtors. 4 The sovereign loans in our dataset are all issued by, or guaranteed by, developing countries.
In our empirical model our endogenous variables are the return premium (of large lenders over small lenders) and the number of joining banks, the number of banks of nonmandated banks that join the syndicate. Our main empirical model incorporates the possibility that the causality between these two variables may be bi-directional. The return premium may be chosen in light of the anticipated number of joining banks, while it also influences commitment amounts, thus generally also affects the number of joining banks. We obtain the following results. First, we find that the upfront fee differential is 5 positively influenced by our proxies for the likelihood of liquidity problems. Furthermore we find that the return premium is positively affected by factors that tend to aggravate coordination problems of lenders in case of renegotiation. These factors are the number of lenders, and the presences of informational issues between the lenders and the borrower. The probability of borrower insolvency, which is of course very important for the pricing of loans, does not explain the return range. These finding suggest that large banks are compensated upfront for potential services provided ex post, including liquidity insurance and coordinating workouts. These services are usually associated with relationship lending in a corporate lending context. Turning to the second hypothesis, our estimates do not support that the return premium is used as an instrument to affect the number of banks that join the syndicate. The number of joining banks is essentially explained by the size of the loan and by the amount of liquidity in the credit market.
The most closely related paper to ours is Gatev and Straham (2008) , who study the impact of anticipated liquidity needs of borrowers on the composition of loan syndicates. They conclude based on their analysis of corporate syndicated loans that "syndicate participants specialize in liquidity-risk management while lead banks manage lending relationships." Our main result that anticipated borrower illiquidity are reflected in the loan pricing is consistent with these findings even though "liquidity needs" of borrowers may have quite different consequences in corporate and sovereign debt markets. Corporate loan facilities are frequently loan commitments and the borrower draws on them in case of liquidity needs. In contrast, in our dataset of sovereign syndicated loans to developing countries term loans are the most frequently encountered.
In this case liquidity needs of borrowers, if severe enough, translate into defaults and renegotiations. Hallak (2008) is the first paper to show that the pricing of loans is affected by the likelihood of illiquidity of the borrower in a sovereign debt context. While his analysis confirms the findings of existing research that anticipated liquidity problems do not affect the loan spreads of sovereign debt contracts, he also finds that proxies of liquidity problems do affect the upfront fees banks. Our paper builds on Hallak's findings using a syndicated loan dataset.
It is the first to analyze why large lenders earn more than small ones.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our dataset of sovereign syndicated loans and document the characteristics of the fees received by banks. We present the empirical strategy in Section 3. Section 4 presents the main results and Section 5 several robustness tests. The last section concludes. The upfront fees schedule is announced at the start of the general syndication stage. It contains the details of the fees banks will receive if they commit funds. Thus, the banks that join during this stage receive an upfront fee purely based on the fact that they provide funds. In contrast, at least some arrangers are actively involved in activities such as screening the borrower, arranging the loan, and often also underwriting the loan. We are interested in finding out why the pay of banks that join in the syndication stage increases in the amounts they commit. Thus, returning to our manual check of the observations, the main reason for manually checking each observation was to determine whether banks had joined in the pre-mandate phase or rather during the general syndication stage. Usually this is clear from the titles awarded to the banks. For example, 7 What has been described is an outline of a typical process prior to the signing of a syndicated loan agreement. Sometimes enough syndicate members are found by the end of the pre-mandate stage so that a contract can be signed immediately. These loans are called "club loans". It also happens that there are two general syndication stages. managers, co-managers, and participants always join the syndicate after the fee structure is made public. However, for example, co-arrangers usually join the syndicate in the syndication stage, but sometimes also beforehand. Our dataset eventually includes 288 loans issued by sovereign borrowers from 32 developing countries. Table 3 Next let us discuss the facts on the compensation of banks. For the vast majority of observations, the interest spread represents the spread over the 6-month USD Libor.
The Data and the Return Premium of Large Lenders
The upfront fees are quite substantial. The minimum and maximum upfront fees (received by the smallest and largest banks who join the syndicate during the general syndication stage) are on average 32 and 52 basis points, respectively. Upfront fees have a quite notable impact on the all-in margins obtained by lenders. To compute the minimum and maximum all-in margin, the minimum and maximum upfront fees have essentially been spread out over the average lifetime of the loan (i.e. "annualized"), and the result is added to the interest spread. We can compute that the lowest and highest "annualized" upfront fees constitute on average 12.2 and 20.7 percent of the minimum all-in-margin, respectively. This range lies a little bit below the 25 percent that Hallak (2008) finds in his dataset of (non-syndicated) sovereign loans. Yet, observe that in Hallak (2008) the lenders provide services ex ante, besides funds.
Finally, the return premium is the difference between the maximum and minimum all-in margins expressed as a fraction of the minimum all-in margin, that is, we define for each facility:
The return premium represents the difference in the rate of returns of those lenders who make a commitment in the highest bracket and those who make a commitment in the lowest bracket. The average return premium is 8.52%. This means that the largest lender in the syndicate receives 8.52% more than the smallest lenders, annually. The return premium varies substantially across observations. The lowest return premium is 0.86% while the highest is 45.84%.
The empirical strategy
As explained in the introduction we would like to test two hypotheses. In this section we state and discuss these hypotheses. We then present our empirical model.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1: The return premium compensates lenders who commit large amounts for a set of services traditionally associated with relationship lending, for example, providing liquidity insurance, and coordinating the lenders in time of liquidity shortages.
Hypothesis 1 has been inspired by evidence from corporate credit with multiple lenders. In corporate loan markets the monitoring role is associated with the borrower's relationship lender(s) or hausbank(s). Liquidity insurance is also a principal service provided by relationship banks (e.g. Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Boot (2000) ). In a multivariate empirical analysis, Elsas (2005) finds that the main factor explaining whether a bank is identified by itself and by others as the borrower's relationship lender is whether this bank carries the largest share of the borrower's debt. The time length of the lending relationship is not a significant determinant.
Empirical studies on syndicated loans also emphasize a role for the lead banks in the bank syndicate in terms of screening and monitoring the borrower (Dennis and Mullineaux (2000); Lee and Mullineaux (2004) ; Sufi (2007) ). For example, the lead banks of the syndicate hold a larger share of the loan as the amount of information about the borrower is smaller and credit risk is relatively higher. These studies also document evidence that the banks that hold the largest stake of the loan have a monitoring function over the lifetime of the syndicated loan.
All studies above focus on corporate credit in a context of multiple lenders.
However, in sovereign debt markets the same forces likely play a role and likely to a greater extent as defaults and work-outs are not governed by structures akin to bankruptcy codes in a corporate debt context. Furthermore our dataset only contains loans to developing countries. We therefore have:
Empirical implication 1: Anticipated liquidity shortages tend to positively affect the return premium.
Based on Hypothesis 1 we would additionally predict that the anticipated number of banks that join the syndicate positively affects the return premium. While the anticipated number of banks does not necessarily increase the likelihood of liquidity problems of the borrower, it does tend to increase coordination costs between the syndicate members if the borrower and the lenders ever renegotiate the loan.
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Hypothesis 1 large lenders carry more of the burden of these coordination costs than small lenders such that:
Empirical implication 2: The (anticipated) number of banks that join the syndicate tends
to positively affect the return premium.
The word "anticipated" has been put in brackets in Empirical implication 2.
Hypothesis 1 really bears on the anticipated number of banks that will join the syndicate, a variable we do not observe. However, as long as the anticipated number of joining banks carries at least some weight towards explaining the actual number of joining banks, then we can use the latter variable as a proxy for the former and we have obtained a testable prediction.
Our second hypothesis is inspired by the observation that borrowers and lenders that recognize the possibility of future liquidity problems may structure the loan contract to as to minimize the expected damage of disorderly workouts. This suggests the relationship between the number of banks and the return premium may be bi-directional.
Hypothesis 2: The return premium is aimed at targeting the number of banks that join the syndicate.
The evidence of Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Ongena and Smith (2000) , Esty and Megginson (2003) , and Brunner and Krahnen (2008) points to the importance of the number of banks in determining coordination costs (besides other institutions, such as bankruptcy legislation, or "bank pools" in Germany). However, there is no research that touches upon the mechanism through which the number of lenders is targeted and this is a 
In Equations 1 and 2 subscripts i are used for observations at the loan facility level, and d1982-1983 for the years (Latin American sovereign debt crisis). These dummies were included because there are either theoretical considerations why the dummies would potentially matter, or because our estimations repeatedly showed the dummies were significant and raised the explained variation in the data.
Next let us discuss the variables of Equation 2. Credit market illiquidity is the yield spread in basis points between representative portfolios of US 30-year Corporate
BAA Bonds and 30-year US Treasury Bonds. A larger value of the yield spread indicates that, on the whole, lenders are more cautious in terms of increasing their credit risk exposure. Such "unwillingness" to lend may mean smaller individual commitments, so that we anticipate Credit market illiquidity has a positive effect on the number of joining banks (ϕ 2 >0). Loan size is the size of the loan facility expressed in 1995 US dollars.
Petersen and Rajan (1994), Ongena and Smith (2000) and Machauer and Weber (2000) have shown that the loan size is an important determinant of the number of lenders, so 18 that we predict ϕ 3 >0. We added two dummies, namely d1982-1983 (see above) and dRefinance, with becomes 1 if our data indicates the purpose of the funds is to refinance an existing loan which is about to mature. Borrowers that refinance their loans have a tendency to work with (a subset of) their existing lenders.
Estimation
Above we presented theoretical arguments that suggest that our two endogenous variables return premium and number of joining banks may be co-determined. However, Hausman tests for endogeneity failed to reject that the Number of joining banks is exogenous in Equation 1, and that Return premium is exogenous in Equation 2. We have therefore estimated Equations 1 and 2 both as a system of equations, as well as using two separate OLS estimations. We use 2SLS as our systems estimator because it is more robust to potential specification errors than 3SLS (see e.g. Wooldridge (2002, pages 198-199) . The 2SLS results are in the first two, and the OLS results in the last two columns of Table 4 .
We will discuss the regression results in the next section.
Results
Anticipated liquidity problems and the return premium
According to Empirical implication 1 of Hypothesis 1 the return premium depends positively on proxies for anticipated liquidity problems of the sovereign borrower when adequately controlling for other relevant factors. Our findings in Table 4 In sum, our results show strong support for Hypothesis 1. Lenders appear to anticipate potential liquidity problems of borrowers and recognize that large lenders will step up in case of renegotiations and carry a disproportionally large share of the costs associated with renegotiation. Though syndicated lending arrangements do not explicitly bind larger lenders to become relationship lender(s), these lenders may have the incentives to take the lead, analogous to the standard public goods result that agents with a large stake tend to provide a disproportionally large share of a public good. It may furthermore be that large lenders may be in a better position to pressure other banks and the borrower into signing a new agreement. Lending is a repeated game and larger 20 lenders who respond in a way that is inconsistent with their perceived role of "special" lender may lose reputational capital (see e.g. Sharpe (1990) or Panyagometh and Roberts (2008) ).
One particular expectation the "market" seems to hold about larger syndicate members seems to be coordination of workouts with the borrower. This story is consistent with past experience of sovereign bank debt renegotiation. For instance, JP Morgan helped coordinate lenders Korean Government in 1997 (see e.g., Morris and Shin, 2004) . And Citibank Vice Chairman, William R. Rhodes, chaired most of the "London Clubs" of Latin American countries in the 1980's (Cline, 1995) .
The return premium and the number of joining banks
Hypothesis 2 suggests that the number of banks that join the syndicate depends negatively on the return premium when adequately controlling for other relevant factors (Empirical implication 3). However, Column 2 of Table 4 shows that 2SLS yields a positive (albeit statistically insignificant) estimated coefficient of the return premium.
The OLS results reported in Column 4 seem to even suggest that the return premium has a significant and positive impact on the number of joining banks. However, such an causal interpretation would be premature at best, in light of our earlier findings in support of Hypothesis 1 that predicts a positive correlation between these two variables.
Either way, the 2SLS estimation leads us to reject Hypothesis 2. This result is not to be interpreted as suggesting that arranger(s) do not target the size of syndicates, and it does not go against the accepted wisdom that informational issues and lender coordination are mitigated by entertaining fewer banking relationships (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994) , Ongena and Smith (2000) , Esty and Megginson (2003) , Brunner and Krahnen (2008) ). The correct interpretation of our failure to accept Hypothesis 2 is simply that our findings do not support the hypothesis that the return premium is the instrument that is used to target the size of the syndicate. This leaves open whether or not arrangers target a given syndicate size.
Our 2SLS 
Robustness analysis
General discussion
How robust are the regression results of the previous section? We have tried out a variety of alternative specifications, each time excluding or including some variable(s). This exercise tended to yield similar estimates for the remaining coefficients. In cases where certain estimated coefficients changed drastically this coincided either with the omission of variable that was important in terms of its contribution to the R 2 , or it concerned a 22 variable for which we found it intuitive to expect a substantial degree of correlation with the variable(s) the coefficient(s) of which underwent substantial change.
We also estimated Equation 1, our main equation, using the robust regression option rreg of STATA, that is, the estimator by Hamilton (1991) which is based on an iterative procedure whereby observations with high residuals in early iterations are assigned lower weights in the final regression that yields the estimates. The results of the rreg estimation are reported in the first column of Table 5 . A comparison of the rreg estimates to the Equation 1 estimates in Table 4 (first and third columns) shows that the estimated coefficients usually do not differ more than 20 percent of their 2SLS and OLS estimates. In all cases the signs of the coefficients stay the same, and significant coefficients remain significant and insignificant ones insignificant.
Finally, we estimated Equation 1 using a reduced sample of observations. In our original estimates we used dummy variables to control for the presence of the World Bank co-financing in tranches of the credit facility and/or the inclusion of tax-spare clauses. However, there are merely 24 loans for which one of these dummies becomes 1 in our dataset and we found these observations to be somewhat idiosyncratic and were generally associated with somewhat higher residuals. The results without these 24 observations are reported in the second column of Table 5 . They are similar to the results reported in Column 3 of Table 4 .
The indicator for borrower illiquidity
The liquidity indicator Reserves/Short-term debt plays a key role in our analysis. While this variable is the most commonly-used measure of liquidity in the sovereign debt literature, some studies have used a liquidity indicator based on the amount of debt serviced by the country over a given period. Substituting Reserves/Short-term debt by Debts service/Exports, i.e. the ratio of total external debt service to exports of good and services of the country of the sovereign borrower, does not materially affect our results.
In the third column of Table 5 we report the estimation results of a specification which is identical to Equation 1 apart from the chosen liquidity proxy. Observe that the estimated coefficients are quite similar to the estimates reported in the first and third columns of Table 4 .
Beyond the number of joining banks
The idea behind Hypothesis 2 was that contracting parties who appreciate the possibility of liquidity problems of the borrower, structure the loan contract so as to minimize the expected negotiation and coordination costs of workouts. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) and others have argued that reducing the number of lenders is one possibility to reduce the costs of workouts. Hypothesis 2 thus investigates whether the return premium is the instrument the arranger or arrangers use to target the number of banks that join the syndicate and our analysis fails to support this hypothesis. However, it could be that the return premium does not so much target the number of joining banks, as well as the overall size of the bank syndicate (i.e. including the arrangers and the agent bank). In line of this reasoning we substituted the endogenous variable in Equation 2 by the total number of banks. The OLS estimates of this model are found in the last column of Table   5 . The estimated coefficients are remarkably similar to the OLS estimates of Equation 2
(Last column of Table 4 ). We have also substituted the number of joining banks in Equations 1-2 by the total number of banks and estimated this system using 2SLS. This also yielded similar results as the ones reported in columns 1 and 2 or Table 4. Thus,   24 there is a close resemblance between explaining the number of banks that join the syndicate and the total size of the syndicate, even in terms of magnitudes of the effects of variables.
Does a careful choice of the return range perhaps target something other than the number of lenders? While in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) coordination costs are reduced by reducing the number of lenders, it is a small step to extend that logic to argue that a greater concentration of the committed amounts by banks will also achieve lower coordination costs. Presumably the power of lenders in workouts increases in their share of the syndicated loan. Thus, workouts would tend to run smoothly as long as a select number of large banks represent a high enough fraction of the loans. Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Carletti (2004) show theoretically that only part of a firm's debt needs to be financed by "monitoring firms" to deter strategic default. The remaining external capital may carry "soft" constraints. Furthermore, the evidence in this paper indicates that the larger lenders in the syndicate carry a relatively large share of the burden when it comes to coordinating banks and providing liquidity insurance in workouts.
Consequently, the actual target of the return premium may perhaps not be so much to target the number of banks, but instead a certain degree of concentration of the loan commitments. The prediction would be that higher return premiums tend to imply higher values of a concentration index such as, for example, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index which is used in Esty and Megginson (2003) , Lee and Mullineaux (2004), and Sufi (2007) . Unfortunately, however, we have too few observations for which we observe the committed amounts of the banks to permit an analysis based on a concentration index.
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Concluding remarks
The rate of return offered to banks that decide to join a bank syndicate increases in the amount they are willing to commit. This paper is the first to report and study this phenomenon. In our dataset of 288 sovereign syndicated loans to developing countries we show that the largest commitments during the general syndication stage are associated with an on average 8.5 percent higher promised annual return than the smallest commitments. It is puzzling that borrowers are willing to pay substantially more to larger lenders seen that these larger lender, or really none of the banks that join the syndicate during the general syndication stage, seem to do more than providing funds.
Our main goal in the paper was to examine the hypothesis that the return premium is a compensation for a set of services that larger lenders are implicitly expected to provide in case the borrower faces liquidity problems before the loan matures and attempts to renegotiate the contract. Such services, such as liquidity provision and lender coordination, are typically associated with relationship lenders in corporate debt markets.
Our results strongly support this hypothesis: the return premium is indeed explained by the likelihood of liquidity shortages. This result is consistent with Gatev and Strahan (2008) who conclude based on their analysis of corporate syndication arrangements that in syndicates the arrangers maintain lending relationships but that participants provide liquidity insurance. We find furthermore that proxies of insolvency are not related to the return premium, but that information asymmetries are. This latter result is consistent with the existing literature that points out that information asymmetries exacerbate coordination problems amongst lenders. Taken together, the results of Gatev and Strahan (2008) and those in this paper suggest that the services traditionally associated with relationship lenders are not provided by a single bank in the syndicate. The arranger(s) is an active participant and offers services such as screening the borrower and underwriting the deal. In all likelihood the arranger(s) stays actively involved throughout the lifetime of the loan. However, our analysis has shown that the arranger is no longer the only active bank when it comes to a workout. Our analysis has shown that large lenders offer liquidity insurance and assist in coordinating workouts.
We also looked into the hypothesis whether the return premium is used as an instrument to target the number of banks that join the syndicate. We fail to accept this second hypothesis. The main determinants of the number of joining banks are the loan size and credit market illiquidity. This finding suggests banks care to limit their exposure to individual sovereign borrowers.
There are two natural directions for future research. First, in this paper we have expressly selected our dataset to comprise loans where the anticipated liquidity problems can be expected to be large. We included only loans to sovereigns, meaning defaults are not governed by any bankruptcy code. Also we only included the relatively risky loans to sovereigns of developing countries. It would be interesting to see if the phenomenon that larger lenders earn more is significant in a corporate syndicated lending as well. An initial step in this direction has been undertaken by the authors and the initial findings suggest the return premium is indeed significant in a corporate syndicated lending context as well. However, the analysis is impeded by data problems similar to the ones that the authors tackled in the course of this study.
Our analysis has focused on merely one explanation for the return range, albeit a very interesting and important one, namely anticipated liquidity problems of the 27 borrower. A second direction for future research is to study other possible determinants for the choice of the return range or, more generally, the upfront fees schedule. The choice of the upfront fees schedule may, for example, affect the probability that the loan is successfully syndicated, or alter the speed with which the syndicate is brought together. 
Variable Description
Endogenous variables in Equations (1) and (2).
Note: Both endogenous variables are based on banks that joined the syndicate during the general syndication stage. That is, we made sure in a manual check of each loan to exclude mandated arrangers and/or underwriters as well as their respective fee payments.
Return premium
Difference in the yearly return between the largest and the smallest syndicate members expressed as a fraction of the yearly return of the smallest members:
all-in margin high is the sum of the interest spread and the annualized highest upfront fee. The annualization is done over the average lifetime of the loan, while the interest spread takes into account possible variations over the lifetime of the loan whenever indicated (e.g., 20bp over libor during years 1-2 and 30bp years 3-5). Annualized all-in low is the sum of the interest spread and the annualized lowest upfront fee.
Number of joining banks
Number of banks in the syndicated loan that were not mandated arrangers and/or underwriters.
Endogenous variables used for robustness analysis, Equation (2') in Table 5 .
Total number of banks
Total number of banks participating in the syndicate, i.e. Number of joining banks plus the number of participating mandated arrangers and underwriters. 
Debt Service/Exports
Ratio of total foreign debt service relative to exports of goods and services. Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank.
Variables affecting the likelihood of insolvency/repudiation:
Long-term Debt/GNP Ratio of foreign-currency-denominated PPG debt with a lifetime of more than a year and GNP.
Source: Global Development Finance, World Bank.
GDP Growth
Yearly growth rate of GDP in constant local currency, average over the previous five years.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank.
Investment
Investment share of GDP.
Source: Penn World Data, University of Pennsylvania.
Political Stability
Political Stability. Number of years since the most recent political regime change in the country.
Source: The Polity IV Project, Center for Systemic Peace.
Other variables:
GDP GDP of the country in constant US dollars.
Government Size
Government Share of GDP.
Source: Penn World Tables, University of Pennsylvania. 
dFirm
The borrower is a firm (which is guaranteed by a sovereign).
dTax Spare
The loan includes a clause that partially or fully exempts interest payments of withholding tax.
dWorld Bank Co-financing The loan is co-financed (but not guaranteed) by the World Bank.
dTrade The primary purpose of the loan is "export-import financing."
dGrace The loan includes a grace period.
d1982-1983
The loan was mandated in 1982 or in 1983.
dOversubscribed
The loan was oversubscribed. 
